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F
ollowing intense debates over free trade
in the 1980s and the ﬁscal crisis in the
1990s, the focus of concern in the pol-
icy world has shifted in recent years to the
widening productivity gap between Canada
and the United States. Business leaders, gov-
ernment officials and media commentators
have sounded alarms about the productivity
gap and have engaged in vigorous debates
about the causes of the problem and the best
policy responses. Advocates have advanced their
favourite culprits, with regulatory inefficien-
cies, innovation lags, relative tax burden and
weak entrepreneurialism often cited, usually
without much evidence. The wider Canadian
public seems to regard the debate with a large
dose of scepticism and perhaps concern about
the implications of the productivity agenda for
labour market prospects and potential trade-
offs between social and economic objectives.
Part of the difficulty, in our view, is that
the productivity debate in Canada has tradi-
tionally focused on narrow economic issues. It
has given inadequate attention to the broader
ramiﬁcations of productivity, not just for our
material standard of living but also for the
choices we make collectively to enhance our
social well-being. The debate has also paid too
little attention to the social determinants of
productivity — that is, to the feedback mech-
anisms running from social conditions and fac-
tors to productivity growth.
The objective of this second issue of The
Review of Economic Performance and Social
Progress is to ﬁll, at least in part, the parallel
lacuna in the research literature in Canada. As
in the public debates, most research focuses
on one side of the duality, emphasizing the
impact of productivity growth on the stan-
dard of living of citizens. Much less attention
is paid to the impact of social conditions on
productivity. However, economic factors alone
cannot explain differences in the growth rates
and productivity levels of countries around
the world, and a comprehensive understand-
ing needs to incorporate institutional and
social factors. A country’s basic human and
social resources are important to its economy.
The levels of education and health of its citi-
zens, the demographic proﬁle of its popula-
tion, the strength of the social networks that
link people, the level of inequality among
individuals and families, and the effectiveness








































































Introduction  12/16/02  1:35 PM  Page 1implications for a country’s economic per-
formance. In short, people and society matter.
The papers in this volume address the
two-way nature of the linkages between pro-
ductivity and social progress. They are organ-
ized into ﬁve sections. The three papers in the
ﬁrst section discuss productivity concepts and
trends in Canada and OECD countries. The
two papers in the second section examine the
impact of productivity on government bal-
ances and natural resources and environmen-
tal sustainability. In the third section, four
papers explore the implications of population
aging, education, health and social diversity
for productivity. In the fourth section, the
focus shifts to the normative dimension of the
issue, with three papers that ask whether pro-
ductivity should be a social priority, includ-
ing one that surveys the attitudes of Canadians
on the question. In the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section,
two papers examine the relationship among
social policy, inequality and productivity.
The purpose of this introduction is
twofold. First, it provides a detailed overview
of the main ﬁndings of all chapters in the vol-
ume. Second, it provides a synthesis of the main
themes that emerge from the different chapters
and their implications for public policy.
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS: 
CONCEPTS AND LINKAGES
Before plunging into complex issues
surrounding the linkages between produc-
tivity and social progress, it is important to
establish as much clarity as possible about
the concepts at the heart of the study, and
the linkages among them.
Deﬁning the term “productivity” poses
little problem, certainly much less than the
concept of “economic performance,” which
was the focus of last year’s volume. As used
in this volume, productivity is deﬁned as the
relationship between output and inputs. The
level of labour productivity is the ratio of real
output at the level of the ﬁrm, industry or
the economy as a whole (measured in physi-
cal units or constant price terms) to the
amount of labour input used to produce the
output (measured in terms of hours or num-
ber of workers). Labour productivity growth
is the change in this ratio over time. Total
factor or multifactor productivity is the ratio
of real output to an index of inputs, which
normally includes labour and capital and may
also include raw materials, purchased servic-
es and energy. Total factor productivity
growth is the change in this ratio over time.
While the deﬁnition of productivity is
straightforward, it should be noted that the
measurement of productivity, particularly in
the service sector, is notoriously tricky.
Technical measurement issues, however, are
not addressed in any detail in the volume.
In contrast with the clarity of the
meaning of productivity, “social progress” is
a much broader idea. As was noted in the
introduction to last year’s volume, social
progress can be manifested by improvements
in a wide range of measures, including the
incomes of families and individuals, the sense
of economic security enjoyed by workers, the
levels of poverty and social exclusion, the
extent of inequality in life chances, the
vibrancy of our distinctive communities, the
strength of social cohesion and the sustain-
ability of our environmental heritage. Such a
complex and multifaceted phenomenon is
thus best thought of as an overarching soci-
etal goal rather than as an analytical concept,
and the contributors to this volume tend to
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social experience.
Any assessment of social progress is also
complex because it must move beyond aggre-
gate measures. Overall indicators of the aver-
age level of social well-being always mask
important variations in the experiences of dif-
ferent individuals and groups. Economic and
social change on a major scale always produces
winners and losers, groups who beneﬁt from
the new order and others whose economic and
social prospects are eroded by the same forces.
The history of wars, it is often observed, is
written by the winning side. The history of
social progress needs to be more balanced.
As well as being complex, social
progress is inevitably a contested idea, because
different people have very different concep-
tions of what constitutes the “good” society.
Even if members of society agree on whether
speciﬁc indicators tap dimensions of social
progress, they will differ on the relative impor-
tance to be attached to the various indicators
and hence on whether social progress, in the
aggregate, is advancing or declining. For cer-
tain indicators, there may even be disagree-
ment about which direction of change
represents social progress, reﬂecting the ideo-
logical or world view of the observer. For
example, some may see a rising proportion of
students in private schools as a negative indi-
cator because they believe such a trend threat-
ens the development of an inclusive society.
Others may see such a trend as positive since
it means individuals have more choice in the
educational options for their children. In the
end, therefore, there can be no single measure
of social progress or well-being. Exploring the
relationships between productivity and social
progress remains a compelling task, but the
judgements rendered in this volume are best
seen as contributions to an open and pluralis-
tic debate on the topic.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the linkages
between productivity and social progress are
many and varied. In some cases the links are
direct and immediate; changes in the average
incomes of Canadians are tightly tied to pro-
ductivity trends. In other cases the links are
much more indirect and conditioned by other
factors. For example, there may be a signiﬁ-
cant lag between productivity improvement
and increased incomes on the one hand, and
Canadians’ own sense of economic security, as
measured by opinion polls, on the other. In yet
other areas, the link between changes in pro-
ductivity and important dimensions of social
well-being may be especially weak. For exam-
ple, productivity may have little impact on
indicators of social capital such as membership
in associations and groups; cultural or social
factors are probably much more decisive in
shaping this aspect of our collective experi-
ence. Finally, in some cases the link between
productivity and social progress may be nega-
tive. For example, the economic growth made
possible by productivity gains may have a neg-
ative effect on certain environmental indica-
tors such as greenhouse gas emissions, or on
quality-of-life indicators such as time spent
commuting.
It is also important to note that the
relationship between productivity and social
progress may not be constant over time. For
example, the impact of higher aggregate real
incomes arising from productivity growth on
the rate of poverty may be strong in certain
periods and weak in others, because of
changes in the nature of growth or the inﬂu-
ence of other factors on poverty.
The importance of the indirect linkages
between productivity and the social lives of
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lic policy. In part, the impact of productivity
on social well-being ﬂows through public pol-
icy. To take the most obvious example, the
post-1973 productivity slowdown that took
place in all OECD countries reduced govern-
ment revenues and increased deﬁcits, and the
growth of social programs in OECD countries,
including Canada, was much less rapid after
1973. Of course, governments did have
options, and fundamentally political judge-
ments inevitably had to be made about how
to proceed. But the erosion of the ﬁscal divi-
dend enjoyed during capitalism’s golden era
from 1945 to 1973 because of slower produc-
tivity growth left governments with fewer ﬁs-
cal resources and hence less room to
manoeuvre. Thus productivity performance is
a powerful factor inﬂuencing public policies,
even if its impact is indirect and mediated by
political and social pressures.
Finally, in comparison with the links
running from productivity to social progress,
those running from social well-being to pro-
ductivity performance are less obvious and less
well documented. Nevertheless, these links are
likely to be signiﬁcant. To take the most obvi-
ous example, in a knowledge-based economy,
social and cultural factors that inﬂuence the
desire and capacity of families to invest in their
children’s education and development have
potentially powerful long-term consequences
for productivity growth. Changes in family
structures and other social patterns that inﬂu-
ence the capacity of families and communities
to make such investments matter. For these and
other reasons, some analysts have argued that
social inequality can have negative implications
for the accumulation of human capital, and that
greater equality can boost long-term produc-
tivity growth. Similarly, many analysts have
argued that the strength of social networks and
the levels of social and political trust represent
a form of social capital with important impli-
cations for economic activity.
The links between productivity and
social progress are thus multiple and complex
and tracking the relationships in a compre-
hensive manner is a challenging analytical
task. Nevertheless, it is possible to make at
least provisional judgements about the core
dynamics at work. The contributors to this
year’s volume provide signiﬁcant insight into
some of the key issues, and point to areas
worthy of further investigation.
PRODUCTIVITY CONCEPTS AND
TRENDS
The three papers in this section discuss
productivity concepts and trends in Canada
and in OECD countries. In the ﬁrst chapter,
Andrew Sharpe provides a comprehensive
non-technical introduction to the productiv-
ity issue, including discussion of the concept
of productivity, measurement issues, trends
and prospects. He begins by noting that pro-
ductivity is the relationship between the out-
put of goods and services and the input of
resources, both human and non-human, used
in their production. In terms of productivi-
ty concepts, the most important are:
> The distinction between productivity
growth rates and productivity levels. The
term “good productivity performance”
is ambiguous. It can refer to a situation
in which a worker produces a large
quantity of output — that is, a high
level of labour productivity — or to a
situation in which the output a worker
produces increases rapidly over time —
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These concepts are often confused in
public debates on productivity.
> The distinction between output per
worker and output per hour. With the
long-term decline in the length of the
workweek during the ﬁrst three-quarters
of the 20th century, growth in output per
hour signiﬁcantly exceeded growth in
output per worker. For international pro-
ductivity level comparisons, countries
with fewer average annual hours worked
per employed person will fare relatively
better in terms of output per hour than in
terms of output per worker.
> The distinction between labour produc-
tivity and total factor productivity. The
former is a partial productivity measure
relating labour input to output, while
the latter relates a combination of inputs,
or the growth of these inputs, to output
or output growth. Sharpe argues that for
discussion of living standard issues,
labour productivity is the more appro-
priate concept as it is the ultimate deter-
minant of real income growth. For
discussion of efficiency in the use of
existing resources, total factor produc-
tivity is the more appropriate concept.
The measurement of productivity is
fraught with conceptual and empirical issues,
and there can be a signiﬁcant margin of error
associated with productivity growth rates, even
at the aggregate level. Sharpe identiﬁes two par-
ticularly important measurement problems,
namely the estimation of real output in the
non-market sector (i.e., public and non-proﬁt
sectors) and the estimation of price indices
(which are needed to calculate real output) for
products where quality has improved signiﬁ-
cantly or for new products (e.g., computers).
According to Sharpe, the most impor-
tant productivity trends that the general
public should be aware of are:
> The post-1973 productivity slowdown,
which has affected all industrial coun-
tries. Business-sector output per hour
growth fell in Canada from an average
annual growth rate of 4.0 percent in the
1946-73 period to 1.4 percent in the
1973-2001 period, increasing the time
required for living standards to double,
from 18 years to 50 years.
> The post-war convergence in OECD pro-
ductivity levels towards the US level. At
the end of the Second World War,
labour productivity levels in all OECD
countries were well below those in the
United States, the technological leader.
Through the importation of US tech-
nology, these countries were able to
catch up to, and in certain cases exceed,
US productivity levels.
> The post-1995 acceleration in labour pro-
ductivity growth in the United States. The
revolution in information technology,
which originated and is strongest in
the United States, appears to have pro-
duced a one-percentage-point upward
shift in trend labour productivity
growth since 1995 in that country, a
development that has not occurred in
other industrialized countries. Despite
the sharp downturn in the high-tech
sector, and even greater declines in the
stock-market valuations of high-tech
companies, the productivity gains of
the second half of the 1990s appear to
be have been sustained in the early
years of the current decade.
> The decline in Canada’s relative internation-
al productivity ranking. In 1950, Canada
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countries in terms of the level of output
per hour, behind the United States only.
With productivity convergence, a num-
ber of countries have enjoyed very rapid
productivity growth in the post-war peri-
od. By 1973, Canada had fallen to fourth
place, by 1985 to 12th place and by 2001
to 13th place. Canada’s level of output per
hour fell from 94.7 percent of the US level
in 1950 to 91.2 percent in 1973, 89.0
percent in 1995 and 83.3 percent in 2001.
> The widening of the Canada-US manufac-
turing productivity gap. Canada has always
had a lower level of labour productivity
in manufacturing than the United States.
Since the mid-1990s, this gap has
widened signiﬁcantly, growing 20 per-
centage points: the Canadian level was
87 percent of the US level in 1994 and
67 percent in 2001. 
Labour Productivity and 
Canadian Living Standards
In the second chapter in this section,
Tony Fisher and Doug Hostland examine,
from an historical perspective, the relationship
among labour productivity, labour income
and living standards in Canada. The authors
focus in particular on the recent divergence
between labour productivity growth and real
wage gains and its implications for Canadian
living standards. They ﬁnd that, once the
appropriate adjustments are made, the labour
share and the non-labour share (composed of
proﬁts, interest and investment income, and
incorporated business income) in national
income tend to revert to their historical means
over the 1926-2001 period, although diver-
gences may last for several years. They note,
for example, that the decline in the labour
share in Canada since 1994 is due not to any
increase in proﬁt share, but to an increase in
the share of depreciation or capital consump-
tion allowances associated with the short serv-
ice lives of high-tech investment goods.
Traditionally, productivity trends have
been related to trends in real wages, with the lat-
ter serving as a proxy for trends in living stan-
dards. The authors argue that this approach is too
narrow, as non-labour sources of income also affect
living standards. Shifts in labour and non-labour
shares have little effect on aggregate household
wealth and income, as households receive income
from all components of national income. For
example, labour productivity growth in excess of
real wage growth does not mean that total
income will lag behind productivity growth. The
relatively slower rate of growth of wages will be
offset by faster growth in other components of
national income such as investment income or
unincorporated business income.
Fisher and Hostland also point out that
the national income accounts are not the appro-
priate framework for addressing the important
issue of income distribution (e.g., extravagant
CEO compensation represents a transfer from
capital’s income share of national income to
labour’s income share!). Rather, discussion of
income distribution is more fruitfully based on
personal income distribution measures such as
the Gini coefficient and the ratio of incomes
between the top and bottom quintiles.
Like other contributors to the volume,
Fisher and Hostland stress that labour pro-
ductivity was the chief source of advances in
living standards in Canada throughout the
20th century. More importantly, however,
they note that the other factors that con-
tributed to growth in living standards in the
past, including increases in the working-age
component of the population and increased
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ly to play as much of a role in the future.
Consequently, productivity will become even
more important as a source of increase in liv-
ing standards.
The authors conclude by emphasizing
the limitations of GDP per capita and produc-
tivity as measures of economic progress. They
strongly support work on broader measures of
economic well-being that incorporate stocks of
wealth and income distribution, which they
believe will provide a more meaningful basis for
policy decisions than the basic indicators pre-
sented in the national income accounts.
Productivity and Income 
Performance in OECD Countries
In the third and ﬁnal chapter in this sec-
tion, Bart van Ark develops a framework for
understanding the signiﬁcant differences in pro-
ductivity and income growth rates among
OECD countries. The framework breaks GDP
per capita into two basic drivers: labour supply
and labour productivity. Labour supply is in
turn determined by the hours worked per per-
son employed, the share of employment in the
working-age population, and the share of the
working-age population in the total population.
Within-industry productivity growth rates and
inter-sectoral shifts in employment shares deter-
mine labour productivity. The former is affect-
ed by the efficiency in factor use (i.e., total
factor productivity), investment in physical cap-
ital and investment in intangible capital.
Van Ark’s useful decomposition of GDP
per capita into its components for OECD coun-
tries in 2001 leads to a number of key ﬁndings:
> The United States, not surprisingly,
had by far the highest GDP per capita,
17 percentage points higher than sec-
ond-place Norway.
> The United States, however, did not
have the highest level of labour pro-
ductivity (output per hour), ranking
ﬁfth behind Belgium, Norway, France
and the Netherlands.
> The key reason for the large gap in GDP
per capita between the United States and
other OECD countries was the much
shorter working time in these countries.
Relative to the average worker in the
United States, the average worker in
Norway put in 29 percent fewer hours
per year in 2001. The corresponding ﬁgures
were 28 percent in the Netherlands, 19 per-
cent in Belgium, 18 percent in Austria and
France, 17 percent in Germany and 16 per-
cent in Denmark.
> In certain countries, lower rates of labour
force participation were also important in
accounting for lower GDP per capita rel-
ative to the United States. Lower partic-
ipation rates reduced GDP per capita
relative to that in the United States by
15 percent in Belgium, 12 percent in
Spain, and 10 percent in Ireland and
France.
> Higher unemployment was also a factor
in accounting for lower GDP per capi-
ta relative to that in the United States
in certain countries, including Spain (7
percent), France and Italy (4 percent),
and Germany and Finland (3 percent).
Differences in the size of the working-
age population relative to the total pop-
ulation was a much less important factor
in accounting for the differences in
GDP per capita across countries.
Van Ark points out that, while from
1950 to 1990 most OECD countries saw a
narrowing of their income gap with the
United States, this has not been the case since
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performance of the labour market in many
OECD countries accounted for this failure to
close the income gap with the United States.
In the second half of the 1990s, it was the
acceleration of productivity growth in the
United States. Van Ark observes that infor-
mation and communication technologies
(ICTs) have been the main source of the pro-
ductivity revival in the United States, and the
smaller size of the sector in other OECD coun-
tries explains their more sluggish productivi-
ty growth.
Van Ark argues that the development of
intangible capital has been a necessary condi-
tion for exploiting the productivity advantages
of ICT investment, although the linkages
between intangible capital and productivity
growth are still poorly understood. He deﬁnes
intangible capital to include human capital,
knowledge capital, organizational capital,
marketing of new products and social capital.
In particular, van Ark notes that the relation-
ship between organizational capital and pro-
ductivity growth may be particularly strong
and in need of additional research.
THE IMPACT OF PRODUCTIVITY
ON SOCIAL WELL-BEING: THE
CASES OF GOVERNMENT FISCAL
BALANCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY
The theme of the second section is the
positive impact that productivity can have on
different aspects of social progress or well-
being. The two chapters in this section exam-
ine the impact of productivity on government
balances and natural resource and environ-
mental sustainability.
In examining the linkages between pro-
ductivity and social progress, one of the ﬁrst
considerations is the potential impact of
changes in productivity growth on govern-
ments’ ﬁscal balances, which in turn affects
their ability to contribute to social progress. Of
course, larger ﬁscal balances do not necessarily
translate into enhanced social measures, as gov-
ernments may have other competing objectives.
But, clearly, determining the sensitivity of ﬁs-
cal balances to alternative productivity growth
rates is an initial step in determining how pro-
ductivity growth can affect the ability of gov-
ernments to pursue social objectives.
In the ﬁrst chapter in this section,
Peter Dungan investigates the sensitivity of
Canadian government ﬁscal balances to alter-
native long-run productivity growth rates
using elements of the FOCUS macroecono-
metric model to conduct simulations to the
year 2030. The simulation strategy employed
here in part parallels the technique used by
the Department of Finance in recent budg-
ets and ﬁscal statements to estimate the
implicit size of the “ﬁscal dividend.” A total
of ﬁve alternative growth paths and sensitiv-
ity tests are presented.
Overall, the simulations indicate that
even relatively small changes in productivity
growth rates can cumulate over several decades
to produce large changes in GDP and living
standards, and this can alter signiﬁcantly the
ﬁscal “room to manoeuvre” of the federal and
provincial governments and of public pension
plans. This is true whether we are contem-
plating higher or lower productivity growth
rates. For instance, a relatively modest addi-
tion of 0.3 percent to annual productivity
growth from 2004 to 2030 increases real GDP
by 8 percent, or $171 billion ($2000), over the
base-case scenario by the end of the period.
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in aggregate government revenues. As Dungan
demonstrates, however, an important factor in
determining more precisely the size of the ﬁs-
cal impact is the response of government-sec-
tor wages to the changes in private-sector real
wages that would likely occur under alternative
productivity growth rates. His sensitivity
results show that if there is a pass-through of
higher productivity growth into higher public-
sector wages (as would seem most likely), then
the ﬁscal impact of higher productivity growth
is muted. Since approximately 75 percent of
government spending on goods and services is
wage-based, this effect is quite substantial.
Under higher productivity growth, some of the
enhanced government revenues ($29 of the $71
billion) simply go to pay higher government-
sector wages, leaving $42 billion, equivalent to
roughly 6 percent of government (base-case)
expenditures, available for expenditure enhance-
ment, tax cuts or debt reduction.
If, on the other hand, projected produc-
tivity growth is reduced by 0.3 percent, then
the negative impact on government revenues
($66 billion by 2030) is partly offset by a
reduction in government wages from what
they would otherwise have been, leaving a ﬁs-
cal-impact shortfall of $39 billion. This off-
setting effect is more important for provincial
governments than for the federal government.
Of course, the size of the ﬁscal impact would
also depend on whether real interest rates are
affected by higher or lower productivity
growth rates, in which case the ﬁscal impact
is on average very small. This would likely be
the case if the change in productivity growth
did not occur only in Canada but rather was a
worldwide phenomenon.
As Dungan points out, this study is only
the beginning of a full inquiry into the inter-
connections between productivity growth and
ﬁscal policy. The results focus on the effect of
productivity growth on government ﬁscal room
to manoeuvre, but there are undoubtedly
important feedback effects from ﬁscal policy
onto productivity growth. How the ﬁscal room
to manoeuvre is used could have important
effects on productivity growth itself: some tax
cuts or expenditure increases could in turn raise
productivity growth, through either improved
technology or capital accumulation, while some
poorly designed new social programs could
reduce incentives and lower productivity growth.
This feedback from ﬁscal policy to productivity
becomes more important the further we go into
the future. Finally, the issue of whether produc-
tivity change is conﬁned to Canada or is part of a
broader trend would also raise competitiveness
issues that would affect domestic policy choices.
As the intense debate on Canada’s rati-
ﬁcation of the Kyoto Accord indicates, the
issue of sustainability of natural capital and its
implications for economic growth ranks high
in the interests of both policy-makers and the
general public. In the second chapter in this
section, Nancy Olewiler makes an important
contribution to the debate on natural resource
sustainability by exploring the crucial, but
often ignored, linkages among natural capital,
sustainability and productivity.
Olewiler deﬁnes sustainability as the
ability of the economy to maintain the ﬂow of
production necessary to prevent a decline in per
capita consumption so that future generations
can have a standard of living equal to or better
than that of the present generation. In looking
at natural capital as an input into production,
Olewiler draws a clear distinction between
those forms of natural capital, such as water
and our atmosphere, that are essential to
human existence, and other resources for which
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essential and non-essential inputs in turn leads
to the concepts of weak and strong sustain-
ability. Weak sustainability assumes that all
the forms of capital involved are perfectly sub-
stitutable for each other, and that sustainabil-
ity requires only that an aggregate stock of
capital be maintained at a level necessary to
ensure indeﬁnite production. Strong sustain-
ability on the other hand recognizes that spe-
ciﬁc forms of natural capital are essential —
that is, they have no substitutes — and that
stocks of these resources must be kept intact to
ensure continued production. The challenge is
to determine what forms of natural capital are
essential and how to sustain the necessary
stocks.
In her chapter, Olewiler examines pro-
ductivity in natural resource industries in
Canada and the United States to determine
whether depletion in natural resource capital
has affected productivity growth. Based on her
detailed analysis of labour and total factor pro-
ductivity growth rates, the author observes that:
> For Canadian non-renewable resource
industries, changes in the stock of nat-
ural capital have not led to a sustained
decrease in labour or total factor pro-
ductivity. Indeed technological change,
whether induced by environmental
regulation or stock depletion, appears
to be contributing to continued pro-
ductivity growth in these industries.
> For Canadian renewable resource indus-
tries, such as logging and ﬁshing, produc-
tivity has been declining due to poor
resource-management practices. While
these industries are certainly not essential
for the overall sustainability of production
in the Canadian economy, their loss does
affect the viability of many communities.
> Ignorance of the state of our environmen-
tal capital and its relationship to produc-
tivity and sustainability is particularly
apparent in our lack of knowledge about
threshold effects. Once a threshold is exceed-
ed, damage to production and productiv-
ity from environmental degradation may
be severe and irreversible. This uncer-
tainty regarding thresholds has led many
researchers to advocate a precautionary
approach to environmental policy.
Olewiler concludes that the develop-
ment of reliable productivity estimates for
natural capital sectors is important for mon-
itoring the sustainability of the Canadian
economy. Reductions in productivity may be
seen as a warning that production and con-
sumption are moving into a path of non-sus-
tainability. Falling productivity in sectors
that rely on natural capital may signal three
possibilities: (1) technological change is not
keeping up with depletion, (2) substitute
inputs are not readily available, or (3) regu-
lation is not addressing, in an appropriate
manner, the market failures associated with
the use of particular resources.
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
PRODUCTIVITY: DEMOGRAPHICS,
HUMAN CAPITAL AND SOCIAL
DIVERSITY
As noted earlier, most research on the
drivers of productivity growth has focused on
economic factors, such as investment, new
technology and innovation, market structures
and openness to trade. The chapter by Richard
Harris, however, makes clear that economic
variables alone do not fully explain differences
in the levels of productivity and economic
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especially the case when attention is focused
on the growth experience of countries at all
levels of development, from the richest to the
poorest. The differences in productivity from
the most to the least developed countries are
enormous, and Harris concludes that coher-
ent explanations must go beyond standard
economic variables to incorporate a wider
range of institutional and social factors.
When attention narrows to the experience of
industrialized or OECD countries, econom-
ic factors do a better job of explaining differ-
ences in their productivity. Nevertheless, even
here a signiﬁcant portion of productivity
growth is unexplained by models built on
purely economic factors, leaving open the ques-
tion of the role of the institutional and social
characteristics of different countries.
The chapters in this section analyze the
implications for productivity of three dimen-
sions of the social structure of countries: their
demographic proﬁle; the nature of their
human capital — deﬁned broadly to include
the skills, education and health of their citi-
zens; and the level of social diversity of the
population.
Aging and Population Growth
As the retirement of the baby boom
cohorts inexorably approaches, the implications
of the aging of the population and the conse-
quent fall in the ratio of consumers to producers
receive growing attention from policy-makers
and the general public. Many believe that the
aging of the population will have negative
effects on productivity and economic growth,
with dire implications for the sustainability of
social programs. In the ﬁrst chapter in this sec-
tion, William Scarth examines the relationship
among population aging, productivity and
growth in living standards, and reaches a more
optimistic conclusion. Indeed, he contends
that aging may in fact lead to increases in pro-
ductivity, even if no policy initiative is taken.
He argues that our economy possesses at least
three adjustment mechanisms that insulate liv-
ing standards from the adverse effects of an
aging population.
The ﬁrst adjustment mechanism is
changes in relative factor prices. Scarth con-
structs a closed-economy model based on over-
lapping generations that shows that when the
baby boomers constitute the old generation,
capital becomes the relatively abundant factor
of production. Interest rates fall and wages rise,
decreasing living standards for the old and rais-
ing them for the young. The change in relative
factor prices leads to greater substitution of
capital for labour, which increases labour pro-
ductivity. However, Scarth expresses caution
regarding the extent to which such closed-
economy effects apply to a small, open econo-
my like Canada where the return on capital
and the wage level are largely determined out-
side the country. It is thus primarily popula-
tion aging in the rest of the world, not in
Canada, that will affect relative factor prices in
this country, and the rest of the world is not
facing as intense demographic pressures as
Canada faces.
A second mechanism insulating liv-
ing standards from an aging population is
changes in saving behaviour motivated by
fear of falling living standards in old age.
This increased savings means that foreign
debt is paid off. Future interest payments to
foreigners are thus lower, leading to higher
levels of domestic consumption. Finally, a
third mechanism is the increasing returns to
human capital arising from the increased rel-
ative scarcity of labour. This leads to greater
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raises productivity growth and living stan-
dards. Scarth concludes that, because of the
adjustment mechanisms inherent in a market
economy, the implications of the retirement of
the baby boom cohorts for productivity and
living standards in Canada may be signiﬁcant-
ly less than many observers currently believe.
The Role of Human Capital
The increased focus and attention of
researchers and policy-makers, in recent
years, on the potential determinants of pro-
ductivity growth has generated considerable
interest in human capital as a key contribut-
ing factor. Skills, innovation and human cap-
ital feature prominently on the policy agenda
of industrialized countries concerned with
productivity and competitiveness issues. Not
surprisingly, formal education is the pre-
ferred and most conventional policy instru-
ment of governments in pursuing these
objectives. Indeed, “more is better” is often
the guiding principle here. The actual link-
ages, however, are not as straightforward as
they may appear. Certainly, there are gains
to be achieved through a better understand-
ing of the relationship between the skills
developed through formal education and
their causal impact on productivity, as well
as a more nuanced approach to policy in this
area. The former is the task Arthur Sweetman
sets for himself in the second chapter in this
section on social determinants. As he points
out, “the issue is not whether education has
beneﬁts but, rather, the magnitude of its
‘true’ beneﬁts, the beneﬁts relative to costs,
and the distribution of costs and beneﬁts.”
Sweetman examines three different sets
of evidence, focusing on the impact of educa-
tion on earnings at the individual level and on
productivity at the macroeconomic level, and
on issues related to the operation of the
Canadian educational system. He begins with
a review of recent challenges to the idea that
more education is always better. For instance,
an important issue is the extent to which the
higher earnings attributed to higher education
are in fact a function of higher innate ability
which causes individuals to both acquire more
education and achieve higher wages. As
Sweetman argues, this would certainly have a
bearing on the effectiveness of additional
investment in education as a policy lever to aid
disadvantaged groups. Another concern in
recent years is whether Canada, which ranks
among the top countries in terms of public
spending on education and levels of educa-
tional attainment, has reached a point where
its population is overeducated and underem-
ployed. Survey results indicating that many
people feel they are overqualiﬁed for their job
or their skills are under-utilized have helped
fuel this debate. Finally at a macroeconomic
level, a signiﬁcant number of studies looking
at the relationship between country-level
measures of educational attainment or inputs
and per capita economic growth have failed to
establish a positive link.
The chapter provides a detailed review
of the literature on the impact of education on
the earnings of individuals. Sweetman makes a
clear distinction between studies that simply
measure the correlation between an addition-
al year of schooling and earnings outcomes and
research on the causal impact of education,
where the methodology explicitly discounts
the effects of unobserved ability. While the
former type of analysis suggests that the return
on a year’s education (in terms of employment
earnings) is in the range of 7 to 15 percent
(with most estimates clustering around
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return to be somewhat lower when only the
causal effect is measured. Yet Sweetman ﬁnds
little evidence that this is the case, and he con-
cludes that the causal private rate of return for
individuals is substantial.
Sweetman’s examination of the relation-
ship between education and economic growth
highlights several key ﬁndings. Having point-
ed to the mixed macroeconomic evidence on
the central role of human capital for economic
growth, the author concludes that the problem
is basically one of measurement. The studies
that failed to ﬁnd a correlation tend to use edu-
cational attainment, enrolment rates or educa-
tional spending as measures of a country’s
human capital. However, recent studies that use
more direct measures of labour force skills based
on the quality of education (e.g., standardized
test results or literacy scores) have found a “sub-
stantial, and remarkably precise, correlation
between human capital and growth.” Based on
his review of endogenous growth literature,
Sweetman concludes that both the quality and
content of education have a sizeable impact on
overall productivity and economic growth. He
cites as an example the results of a study by
Barro (2001) which suggest that an additional
year of education of “average” quality is associ-
ated with an annual increase of 0.44 percent in
GDP. This implies a real social rate of return
on education of about 7 percent. Educational
quality is thus clearly more important for
national economic outcomes than credentials or
inputs. Indeed, on the latter Sweetman ﬁnds
that there is “little evidence at the internation-
al level that school resources are highly corre-
lated with the quality, or skill level, of the
labour force.”
Sweetman’s chapter also addresses sev-
eral issues related to the functioning of the
Canadian education system. Canadian data not
only show the expected positive relationship
between levels of education and labour mar-
ket outcomes such as hourly wages and the
likelihood of employment, but also reveal
remarkably good educational outcomes. In
addition to the consequent increases in the
national standard of living, his analysis sug-
gests that the large-scale increases in Canadian
educational enrolment in previous decades
may have prevented increases in inequality
due to the rapid growth in the supply of
skilled labour. Sweetman’s conclusion is that
there has been and clearly will continue to be
a key role for education policy in improving
Canada’s productivity and standard of living.
An important question for policy-makers,
however, is whether the education system is
achieving its full potential. The main chal-
lenge is one of resource allocation in a context
in which there seems to be on the one hand
little correlation between the magnitude and
the allocation of resources and educational out-
comes and on the other hand insufficient
information to channel these resources wisely.
While human capital is commonly asso-
ciated with education and skills, health also has
potential links to productivity. In the third
chapter in this section, Emile Tompa provides
a comprehensive review of the theoretical under-
pinnings and empirical evidence of the health-
productivity relationship with an emphasis on
the implications for public policy. As the author
demonstrates, this relationship goes well beyond
the obvious effect of health on capacity to work
in terms of both energy level and working
time. Tompa describes three additional path-
ways through which health can affect produc-
tivity at an aggregate level. For instance,
individuals with a longer life expectancy may
choose to invest more in education as they
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They may also be motivated to save more for
retirement, which would lead to greater accu-
mulation of physical capital. Finally, improve-
ment in the survival and health of young
children may provide incentives for reduced
fertility and may result in increased labour
force participation.
Tompa’s review of historical economic
trends reveals “substantive evidence con-
cerning the productivity impact of increased
life expectancy and reduced morbidity over
the last few centuries in Europe and the
United States.” He cites estimates indicating
that substantial improvements in health and
nutrition explain as much as 30 percent of
growth in per capita income in the United
Kingdom since 1790. Similar estimates of
the impacts of health are also found in cross-
country studies based on data for the last 50
years, which would suggest that these his-
torical trends have not fully run their course.
As expected, Tompa ﬁnds considerable
emphasis on human capital in recent macro-
economic research on productivity, but much
less attention to human capital in the form
of health. Nevertheless in those studies that
did include a measure of health, the associa-
tion with productivity was signiﬁcant and
positive. The author reports results from a
range of studies indicating that between 21
and 47 percent of GDP growth per worker
over the last 25 to 30 years can be linked to
improvements in the health of populations.
As Tompa points out, however, most of the
research in this area has focused on life
expectancy as a measure of health, which, given
signiﬁcant convergence among developed coun-
tries, has become a less salient indicator in
explaining productivity differences among these
countries. In his view this clearly underscores
the need for more reﬁned and relevant indica-
tors (e.g., morbidity, vitality, mental health
and acuity) if we are to fully comprehend the
contemporary role of health as a productivity
driver in developed economies.
Looking at the health-productivity rela-
tionship from a microeconomic perspective,
Tompa highlights the extensive costs attribut-
able to work-related injuries and illnesses. For
instance, in Canada the direct costs (i.e., indem-
nity payments, insurance and medical expenses)
were estimated on the order of $5.7 billion in
2000. The indirect costs, in terms of lost earn-
ings and employer adjustment costs, were more
than twice that amount. While there was a 40-
percent reduction in injury claims in Canada
between 1990 and 1998, it is not clear to what
extent this can be attributed to the effectiveness
of insurance and regulatory mechanisms, the
main policy levers in this area, or some broader
economic trends. Another concern is the fact
that occupational health and safety regulation
and workers’ compensation programs are still
focused on the types of injuries and exposure
that are characteristic of manufacturing and
resource-based industries. There are indications
that policy has not kept pace with the changing
needs brought on by the dramatic changes in
the labour market and the workplace as a result
of the shift from manufacturing to services, tech-
nological change, and new management and
organizational practices.
In the ﬁnal section of his chapter,
Tompa reviews the evidence on the causes and
the costs of absences from work due to sick-
ness. Canadian absence rates due to illness and
disability have increased substantially since
the mid-1990s. Surprisingly, he ﬁnds that
most of the research on potential causes of
sickness tends to focus on potential contribut-
ing factors that are perceived as amenable to
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attention to health status as an explanatory
factor. The work that does examine this link
indicates that chronic and acute physical and
mental conditions, along with health-related
behaviour, do account for a signiﬁcant portion
of sickness absence. However, the evidence on
workplace health-promotion initiatives shows
only modest results in terms of reduction in
sickness absence. According to Tompa, such
initiatives are often too narrowly focused on
behavioural and lifestyle factors and need to
be broadened to include organizational factors.
Moreover, the more limited and short-term
objectives of ﬁrm-level initiatives in this area
underscore the important role that govern-
ments can play in improving the health of the
labour force and the population as a whole and
in turn overall productivity.
Given the multifaceted nature of the
factors that inﬂuence health and, by exten-
sion, productivity, a more holistic approach
to population health, including initiatives in
areas traditionally considered outside the
purview of health policy, may prove useful.
Indeed Tompa’s review of the health-pro-
ductivity relationship from a human capital
perspective suggests that education policy,
child-care and family policy, and labour mar-
ket policy are all important avenues through
which the public sector can have an impact
on population health.
Social Diversity
In the ﬁnal chapter in this section,
Quentin Grafton, Stephen Knowles and
Dorian Owen examine the implications for
productivity arising from the level of social
diversity along a variety of dimensions, includ-
ing ethnic, linguistic and religious differences,
and inequalities between rich and poor. Their
basic intuition is that human beings tend to
associate and communicate most readily with
people similar to themselves, and their hypoth-
esis is therefore that “social divergence” gener-
ates social barriers to communication among
groups, inhibiting the diffusion of knowledge
and lowering the level of productivity in the
economy. As a consequence, the more diverse
the society and the greater the number of dis-
tinct social groups, the higher the communi-
cation costs and the greater the barriers to the
exchange of ideas and innovation.
Grafton and his colleagues compare
their concept of social distance to related con-
cepts such as social capital, trust and social
networks. They also survey the existing
research on the economic consequences of dif-
ferent indicators of social divergence. The
impact of the polarization of societies along
ethnic lines has received considerable atten-
tion in the literature on economic develop-
ment. A variety of analysts have concluded
that ethnic diversity tends to generate high lev-
els of rent-seeking among competing ethnic
groups, at the expense of general economic poli-
cies that promote growth. Ethnolinguistic and
religious diversity is also a predictor of conﬂict,
political instability and weak institutional
frameworks, all of which can retard growth.
Similar ﬁndings emerge in terms of income
inequality and inequalities in levels of educa-
tional attainment, a theme to which we return
below in our discussion of the chapter by
Richard Harris.
The chapter by Grafton, Knowles and
Owen also summarizes the result of research
conducted by the authors themselves, in
which they analyze the impact on total fac-
tor productivity of a set of measures of social
divergence, using data from a cross-section
of 31 developing countries. Their ﬁndings
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sity and economic inequality weaken eco-
nomic performance.
These research ﬁndings are clearly pre-
liminary, and are subject to important limi-
tations, as the authors indicate. For example,
indicators of social divergence do not direct-
ly measure the extent and quality of com-
munication among individuals and across
social groups in a society. More direct meas-
ures of the links and exchanges among indi-
viduals would allow a clearer test of the
proposition that social diversity inhibits the
diffusion of knowledge and innovation. In
addition, most of the literature on the eco-
nomic consequences of social fragmentation
uses data sets that are dominated by the
experience of developing countries, and the
authors own analysis is limited to third world
nations. The applicability of such ﬁndings to
high-income countries that are socially
diverse, including Canada, is an open ques-
tion. Such countries tend to have much
stronger institutional frameworks and richer
communications networks that may well
reduce the barriers to exchange across groups.
Finally, Grafton and his colleagues stress
that their analysis does not imply that social
homogeneity is to be preferred. Social diversi-
ty can also have important economic beneﬁts,
as suggested by J.S. Mill in a passage quoted
by the authors: “It is hardly possible to over-
rate the value…of placing human beings in
contact with persons dissimilar to themselves,
and with modes of thought and action unlike
those with which they are familiar.” The dan-
ger, the authors argue, is that barriers to com-
munication across groups can prevent the
beneﬁts of diversity from being realized. The
challenge for multicultural countries like
Canada is therefore to develop institutions and
policies that facilitate communication among
groups. From this perspective, initiatives such
as bilingualism, multiculturalism and services
for recently arrived immigrants are not simply
instruments of cultural integration; they are
also instruments of productivity enhancement.
Social factors such as demography, edu-
cational levels, health care and social diversity
may not be standard features of the debate
about the determinants of productivity growth.
But the chapters in this section illustrate the
importance of understanding the potential link-
ages that run from social dynamics to econom-
ic performance in advanced economies.
SHOULD PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
BE A SOCIAL PRIORITY?
Although the debate over productivity
turns in part on empirical evidence of the rela-
tionships at work, it also touches on funda-
mental normative questions about values, the
nature of the good society and the purposes of
public action. In the most general sense, it is
difficult to challenge a commitment to pro-
ductivity or efficiency, understood as the best
possible use of scarce resources to achieve a val-
ued end. Who could be opposed to achieving
greater human welfare — to meeting our eco-
nomic, social and psychological needs more
fully — with the resources at our disposal? In
most policy debates, however, the concept of
productivity tends to take on a narrow eco-
nomic focus, one concerned with maximizing
economic output. The social priority of this
conception of productivity is certainly open to
challenge, both in theory and in active politics,
and the challenge emerges strongly in the three
contributions in this section. The ﬁrst questions
the beneﬁts that productivity growth has
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second analyzes survey results of the attitudes
of Canadians towards the productivity issue.
The third discusses productivity and accounta-
bility across the private, public and voluntary
sectors.
In a provocative contribution, Joseph
Heath argues that we tend to overestimate the
contribution that further productivity growth
will make to the welfare of Canadians.
Traditionally, productivity growth was thought
to contribute to increased leisure time, greater
consumer satisfaction, the elimination of poverty
and greater public support for redistributive
efforts to narrow social inequality. While accept-
ing that such beneﬁts have ﬂowed in the past,
Heath argues that in the last 25 years produc-
tivity growth has contributed less and less to
the well-being of Canadians. He points to the
following indicators:
> After a long period of growth in leisure
time, average working hours per week
have begun to edge up again in North
America over the last two decades.
Moreover, a dramatic increase in two-
income families — reﬂecting in part the
widespread perception that it is impos-
sible to maintain a middle-class lifestyle
on the basis of one salary — has made
the juggling of work and family increas-
ingly difficult for many Canadians.
> While productivity growth has led to high-
er consumption, there is no evidence that it
has produced greater overall consumer sat-
isfaction or happiness. Heath draws on a
number of surveys that show that whereas
economic growth is strongly associated
with increased happiness in poor countries,
there is no correlation between higher con-
sumption and increased happiness in richer
countries. Certainly, there is little evidence
that people in rich countries have become
happier in the last 25 years.
> Economic growth alone no longer seems
to be reducing poverty. Important gains
were made in the post-war decades as a
result of the expansion of redistributive
government programs, but Heath points
to studies ﬁnding no reduction in the
level of “basic needs” poverty since the
late 1970s.
> Economic growth during the last 25
years has not increased people’s willing-
ness to share through redistributive pro-
grams. Heath argues that there seems to
be growing middle-class resistance to
redistribution and the taxation needed to
support it.
The key puzzle for Heath is why further
economic growth does not lead to greater hap-
piness. In attempting to solve this puzzle, he can-
vasses three currents of thought in the literature.
One possible explanation is that increased con-
sumption does not generate lasting incre-
ments in welfare, because the process of
satisfying our desires generates new desires,
an interpretation that Heath traces from clas-
sical Greek philosophers to modern analysts
such as John Kenneth Galbraith. A second
explanation, which Heath describes as neo-
Veblenian, contends that consumption not
only satisﬁes needs but also communicates
status, class, upbringing and tastes. The dif-
ﬁculty with this element of consumption is
that such status hierarchies have a zero-sum
structure. If a spurt of economic growth sud-
denly allowed everyone to purchase an exot-
ic car, the process would cancel out the status
inherent in driving one. A third possible
explanation draws on the work of Fred
Hirsch, who argues that the supply of some
goods, which he labels positional goods, is
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ple. For these goods, the process of econom-
ic growth does not increase their quantity; it
increases only their relative prices. As people
become richer, therefore, some goods may
become easier to acquire but positional goods
continue to recede over the horizon.
Heath argues that if these three forms of
consumption absorb a signiﬁcant portion of the
beneﬁts of economic growth, there will be little
increase in satisfaction, at either the individual
or the aggregate level. For Heath, this argues
against making productivity growth a social
priority. For this reason, he is sceptical about
investing scarce public dollars in a productivi-
ty agenda, and believes that other forms of
investment will be more effective in enhancing
the welfare of Canadians. He suggests a num-
ber of possibilities, including dealing seriously
with the externalities generated by economic
growth for the environment, reducing crowd-
ing in urban areas, increasing the supply of
public goods, promoting leisure and increasing
individuals’ sense of security. However, his key
point is that since productivity growth does not
generate the beneﬁts we expect, it should not
be treated as an unchallenged priority, and we
should not worry about our relative productiv-
ity compared to other countries, such as the
United States. There is no reason why a decline
in our relative “standard of living” should nec-
essarily mean a decline in our quality of life.
Canadian Attitudes Towards
Productivity Issues
These philosophical debates are echoed
in the attitudes of the Canadian public,
which are explored in the chapter by Frank
Graves and Richard Jenkins. The distinction
between our standard of living and our qual-
ity of life is a powerful one for Canadians.
The economic citizen who emerges from
Graves and Jenkins’s data is relatively aware of
the terms of the productivity debate. Canadians
appear to have a broadly optimistic view of the
economy, but give the country only a lukewarm
overall rating of its productivity. They are cer-
tainly aware of the divergent trends in
Canada and the United States. Moreover,
although improved productivity does not
rank as high as health care, education, the
environment and crime prevention, the public
does see it as an important goal. Admittedly,
this broadly positive orientation is qualiﬁed by
some scepticism. A slim majority of Canadians
believe that recent concern about productiv-
ity has been manufactured by large corpora-
tions and wealthy Canadians, and a minority
see talk about productivity as ideological code
for job losses and lower pay. Nevertheless, a
strong majority believes that improved pro-
ductivity will create more jobs and especially
more high-skill jobs. Overall, Graves and
Jenkins conclude, the public leans towards a
positive view of a productivity agenda.
Nevertheless, the Canadian public’s atti-
tude towards productivity is qualiﬁed by a com-
mitment to a broader sense of quality of life.
Graves and Jenkins report that Canadians place
considerably greater emphasis on quality of life
as a goal as compared with a high standard of liv-
ing when these are traded off. While Canadians
are keenly aware that incomes are higher in the
United States, the public overwhelmingly
believes that the quality of life in Canada is supe-
rior to that enjoyed south of the border.
This attitude also inﬂuences the public’s
reaction to the policy debate about how to
improve Canada’s productivity. Graves and
Jenkins ﬁnd a strong preference among
Canadians for human and social investment
priorities (e.g., improving health care, enhanc-
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hood development) in contrast to prescriptions
such as tax cuts or R&D investments often
advocated by key voices in the debate. This
dichotomy is particularly apparent when the
general public and members of various elite
groups are asked to choose among three gov-
ernment strategies to improve productivity: (a)
a national learning strategy to invest in the
education and training of Canadian workers,
(b) corporate and income tax cuts to reduce
costs and stimulate growth, and (c) a national
technology strategy to help business and citi-
zens access the latest high-tech processes and
equipment. According to Graves and Jenkins,
“there is clearly a signiﬁcant gap in the under-
standing of how productivity should be dealt
with between the residents of Canada’s family
rooms and the residents of its boardrooms.” A
majority of opinion leaders (57 percent) sup-
port a strategy of cutting corporate and income
taxes, and this preference is almost unanimous
among private-sector elites (86 percent).
However, for Canadians generally the preferred
option is a national learning strategy (40 per-
cent), with tax cuts clearly in second place (33
percent). 
The public also overwhelmingly rejects
the idea that the current level of social spend-
ing is an impediment to improving Canadian
productivity. Rather, they see social pro-
grams as a form of investment that increases
productivity by ensuring a healthy, educat-
ed and secure population. How Canadians
would measure a successful innovation agen-
da is also consistent with this view. Having
more skilled workers electing to stay in
Canada and achieving a higher quality of life
are considered the best indicators.
Thus in both philosophical debates and
public opinion, support for productivity as a
social priority is conditioned by an insistence
that the larger goal is quality of life rather
than a narrow conception of our standard of
living deﬁned in purely economic terms, and
that a policy agenda focusing on increasing
productivity should not come at the expense
of other priorities.
Implications for the Public and
Voluntary Sectors
The chapter by Janice Gross Stein also
cautions against the dangers of adopting a nar-
row conception of productivity and efficiency.
Building on her analysis in The Cult of Efficiency
(2001), she argues that the language of efficien-
cy, understood narrowly as cost-effectiveness,
confronts distinctive problems when transferred
from the private sector to the public and volun-
tary sectors. The efficiency or productivity of a
public service is determined by measuring the
value or utility that it creates. However, such
measurements are much more difficult than
those carried out in the private sector, where
the feedback provided by the market provides
a continuous measure of value. As a result,
demands for efficiency or productivity in pub-
lic services have tended to be translated into
simple exercises in cost-containment and a
determination to deliver public services at the
lowest possible cost.
Stein contends that the collapse of the
language of efficiency into mere cost-contain-
ment has actually undermined the effectiveness
and productivity of the public and voluntary
sectors. She illustrates the perverse results along
three dimensions: the inability to provide for
unexpected contingencies, cuts in investment
in research and development, and the problems
in maintaining full accountability.
The private sector, Stein insists, under-
stands that redundant capacity is essential in an
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September 2001 most of the ﬁrms housed in
the World Trade Center were operational again
within a few hours because they had built
redundancy into their operations, not only
backing up their data systems but also provid-
ing for alternative command-and-control capac-
ities. Such redundancy is normally understood
as excess or unproductive capacity, but ﬁrms in
the private sector have been willing to back up
their essential systems to cope with emergen-
cies, breakdowns and unanticipated needs. The
public sector, she argues, is not allowed this
luxury. With the exception of security and
defence, redundant capacity is seen as “ineffi-
cient,” leaving our emergency services, health
systems, environmental protection programs
and other essential services ill-equipped to
respond effectively to the unexpected.
A similar pattern appears in research and
development. The private sector invests in
research and development and does not insist
that R&D divisions be productive within short
time horizons. The drive for “efficiency,” how-
ever, leaves little tolerance for similar invest-
ments in the public and voluntary sectors.
During the cost-containment drives in the pub-
lic sector during the 1980s and 1990s, research
advisory bodies were closed, and policy units
within departments shrank in size. Many lead-
ers within the public service at the federal and
provincial levels worry about the policy capac-
ity of the organizations they lead. Stein sees
even stronger constraints in the voluntary sec-
tor. In the era of downsizing and alternative
service delivery, the voluntary sector is expect-
ed to deliver a wider range of important public
services with limited resources. But the volun-
tary sector is not ﬁnanced to conduct the serious
research and evaluation required to constantly
reﬁne and improve the services it provides.
Finally, Stein argues that the concepts of
efficiency and productivity, as they have been
applied to the public and voluntary sectors, do
not give sufficient scope to the multiple forms
of accountability expected of those sectors. In
addition to accountability “upward” to elected
representatives in the case of the public sector
and to funding agencies in the case of the vol-
untary sector, Stein argues that public and vol-
untary organizations also have accountabilities
“outward” to clients, stakeholders and the wider
community. Pressures for greater accountability
in the name of efficiency and cost-containment
have tightened accountability upward, reducing
the operating ﬂexibility needed for accountabil-
ity outward in daily program activities. As a
result, it has compromised this wider social
responsibility of public and voluntary organiza-
tions, weakening their roots in the community
and eroding the public’s trust in them.
SOCIAL POLICY, INEQUALITY 
AND PRODUCTIVITY
The question of whether productivity
growth is a social priority raises the related
question of whether there is an implicit trade-
off between economic growth and social well-
being. Establishing the relative priority of
different goals is especially important if the
tradeoffs are harsh, if more of one requires deep
sacriﬁces of another valued goal. But is this the
situation we face? Is there a sharp tradeoff
between productivity growth and social poli-
cy objectives? Or could there actually be a pos-
itive relationship between these two agendas?
The two chapters in this section tackle these
questions from different perspectives.
In the ﬁrst chapter in this section,
Richard Harris surveys recent challenges to
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conﬂict between economic efficiency and social
equality, a view neatly summarized in the title
of Okun’s famous book, Equality and Efficiency:
The Big Tradeoff (1975). This view gained
renewed currency in the policy debates of the
1990s, as commentators contrasted the eco-
nomic performance of Europe and the United
States in that decade. The European record
was one of slow economic growth, particular-
ly of employment, a pattern many commen-
tators dubbed “Eurosclerosis” and blamed on
the welfare state. In contrast, the United States
was recording a major surge in employment
and strong productivity growth, which was
widely heralded as the advent of a new econ-
omy — indeed a third industrial revolution
— rooted in innovation in the information,
communications and telecommunications
ﬁelds. This growth was preceded by a signiﬁ-
cant rise in inequality in the United States,
leading many to infer that higher levels of
inequality seemed to contribute to growth.
More recently, however, this traditional
view has been challenged both by cross-nation-
al empirical studies and by theoretical advances.
This recent research seems to suggest that there
is no efficiency-equity tradeoff and that social
policy and greater equality may actually con-
tribute to higher productivity growth. Richard
Harris surveys two streams of recent research
that point in this direction. In the early 1990s
a number of researchers analyzed cross-section-
al and time-series data for both developing and
developed countries, and identiﬁed a robust
negative correlation between measures of
income inequality and economic growth. This
evidence would seem to suggest that greater
equality can actually contribute to stronger eco-
nomic growth. However, the majority of these
studies involved samples dominated by devel-
oping countries. When attention is focused on
OECD countries alone, the evidence is far from
conclusive. Indeed, Harris concludes that the
empirical case for a link running from greater
income equality to higher economic growth for
high-income countries is “at best statistically
fragile and at worst insigniﬁcant.” But he also
cautions that there is no signiﬁcant evidence for
the traditional idea of a tradeoff between equal-
ity and growth.
The chapter also examines new theoreti-
cal literature, especially the new endogenous
growth theory, which suggests that increases in
inequality can hurt growth. However, Harris
concludes that the theoretical literature is too
diverse and too susceptible to changes in
assumptions and parameters to form the basis
for reliable policy formulation without empiri-
cal validation. And that validation, as we have
seen, is not available, at least not yet.
Harris then narrows his focus to the
direct relationship between social policy and
growth, without reference to an intervening
effect on social inequality. After all, many
social programs are not designed primarily
to alter the level of inequality in a society,
but nonetheless may have an impact on pro-
ductivity. Here the evidence seems more per-
suasive. While there is some evidence that
high overall levels of government spending
on social programs may reduce growth, much
stronger results are found when social spend-
ing is disaggregated into different functions.
Initial ﬁndings suggest that passive social
spending, such as traditional income-support
programs, is prejudicial to growth but that
active social spending, such as expenditures
on training and labour market adjustment,
promote growth. Moreover, education stands
in a class by itself. As Sweetman does in his
chapter on human capital, Harris points to
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tion has a substantial effect on productivity
and that much of Canada’s economic growth
can be attributed to Canadians’ high levels of
educational attainment. While the evidence
for health expenditures is less strong, Harris
concludes that the productivity case for
improving human capital is compelling.
At the broadest level, then, Harris con-
cludes that the general case for linking social
policy and inequality to productivity remains
unproven. The productivity case for active
social spending and for improving human
capital is clear, but more research is needed
before a wider claim can be established.
The second chapter in this section, that
by William Watson, also engages these themes.
Watson challenges Joseph Heath’s interpreta-
tion of the beneﬁts of productivity growth, but
agrees with Richard Harris’s views on the state
of our knowledge about the potential contri-
bution of social programs to productivity
growth.
Watson tackles Heath’s assessment of the
social beneﬁts of productivity growth directly,
starting with the issues of social inequality and
poverty. He argues that there has been no ﬂag-
ging in redistributive effort in Canada. Although
market incomes have become more unequal, the
tax-and-transfer system has continued to offset
the impact, with the result that the post-
tax/transfer distribution of income has, in his
words, “remained almost eerily constant,” at
least through 1997. In the case of poverty,
Watson counters Heath’s focus on the last
25 years with an appeal to the long view of
human history, which demonstrates that pro-
ductivity increases have dramatically reduced
poverty in Canada and throughout the Western
world. Watson is less direct in his critique of
Heath’s focus on consumer satisfaction or happi-
ness, but argues that citizen choice may reveal an
underlying preference for income over leisure.
Moreover, he challenges what he sees as Heath’s
preference for enhancing public expenditures,
emphasizing the scope for government failures
and the possibility that higher tax rates in the
contemporary period have increased the mar-
ginal cost of public funds.
Even if one were able to resolve the
question of the appropriate balance between
the public and private sectors, Watson
believes that the case for higher productivi-
ty would remain compelling. In his words, it
is “hard to understand how getting more
‘stuff’ for a given effort would be wasteful.”
He therefore turns to the issue of the deter-
minants of productivity growth and the role
that social programs might play in enhanc-
ing it. Here, Watson remains a sceptic.
Drawing on Hayek, he argues that societies
are extremely complex phenomena, and that
we simply do not know enough to advance
conﬁdent policy prescriptions about the role
of social policy in enhancing productivity.
Even if we did succeed in analyzing the rela-
tionships between social policy and growth
in the past, we cannot be sure that the driv-
ers in the past will be the drivers in the
future. In addition, Watson remains con-
cerned about the problems he sees as inher-
ent in public action: the possibility of
government failure, the possibility of dupli-
cating private action and the marginal cost
of public funds.
In the absence of powerful analytical
guidance, Watson concludes, reform of social
policy will inevitably be guided primarily by
intuition, politics and hunches. In these cir-
cumstances, he counsels modesty in aspirations.
Social policy changes should be made at the
margin, in small steps, program by program.
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sonal intuitions and hunches call for more
competition in health care and education, more
support for women who wish to take time off
to raise their young children, and continued
awareness that — whatever the broad rela-
tionship between social policy and growth —
poor design in individual welfare programs can
have harmful effects on productivity.
The broad conclusions emerging from
the papers in this section actually increase the
challenges facing policy-makers. The old
mythology that there is an inevitable tradeoff
between efficiency and equality must be set
aside. But new ideas suggesting that inequal-
ity is harmful for economic growth as yet lack
compelling empirical support. As a result, the
policy-maker must make do without conven-
ient intellectual crutches, and the implica-
tions of social programs for productivity must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As often is
the case, research has increased, rather than





Standing back from the detailed analy-
ses presented in the various chapters brings
into focus a number of larger themes that run
through the volume as a whole. Three major
implications leap out from the pages: the
two-way nature of the relationship between
productivity and social progress, the long-
term and largely indirect nature of the role
of public policy in enhancing productivity,
and need to broaden the debate over produc-
tivity in Canada.
A Two-Way Relationship
The two-way or reciprocal relationship
between productivity and social progress is
the central theme of the volume. Both sides
of this relationship are relevant to social
progress. Looking at the ﬁrst linkage, pro-
ductivity increases the amount of material
wealth that a given hour of labour can produce.
However, too often advocates of a productivity
agenda highlight only its importance for our
material standard of living, giving such an
agenda an unnecessarily narrow political
appeal. The additional wealth created by pro-
ductivity growth can be taken in different
forms: private consumption, enhanced social
programs, lower taxes, more leisure time, or
some combination of all four of these. In
effect, productivity growth provides more
opportunity for society.
Greater productivity is not a necessary
condition for social progress; indeed, we could
choose to devote a larger proportion of our
existing income to social purposes if we wished;
and certainly greater productivity does not
guarantee greater social well-being, as Joseph
Heath correctly emphasizes. What paths are
taken depend on social and political choices. In
the real world of politics, however, productiv-
ity growth does expand the choices open to
society, and reduces the apparently zero-sum
nature of choices inherent in a weak economy.
It is no accident that the welfare state expand-
ed greatly during the golden years of capital-
ism following the Second World War. There
is a social as well as an economic case to be
made for productivity growth, and it is unfor-
tunate that the advocates of a productivity
agenda tend to cast it in such narrow terms.
These realities should inform assessments
of the performance of different countries around
the world. Much has been made of the contrast
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United States and that of Europe in the last
decade. Clearly, the link between productivity
and living standards, in terms of both levels and
growth rates, is crucial. Countries with high
levels of output per hour tend to have high lev-
els of income, as measured by GDP per capita,
and countries with rapid labour productivity
growth tend to have fast GDP per capita
growth. But as the data presented in the van
Ark paper show, certain European countries
have very high levels of output per hour but rel-
atively low levels of income. This is because
average annual hours worked and/or labour
force participation are low. The working-age
population in these countries thus enjoys
greater leisure but less income than would be
the case if they worked longer and had higher
labour force participation. It is misleading to
characterize these countries as having a lower
standard of living than countries with compa-
rable productivity levels and higher income lev-
els, when a conscious choice is made to use
productivity gains for additional leisure instead
of income. Indeed, a broadly deﬁned measure
of living standards or economic well-being
would include leisure as well as income. This
inclusion of leisure, as well as income, in the
measurement of living standards thus more
fully deﬁnes and tightens the link between pro-
ductivity and living standards. Productivity
growth increases the production possibility
frontier of society, allowing both greater income
and greater leisure. Societies make different
choices about which combination of these two
variables they prefer.
Gaining a socially aware understanding
of the role of productivity growth will be espe-
cially important in the years to come. While
labour productivity was the main source of
advances in living standards in Canada
through the 20th century, other factors were
also important, including increases in the rel-
ative size of the working-age component of the
population and increased female labour force
participation. These trends have by now large-
ly run their course. As noted by a number of
contributors, with the retirements of the baby
boom cohorts and the attainment of high lev-
els of female labour force participation, the
contribution of these factors to further increas-
es in living standards will be considerably
smaller in the future. Consequently, produc-
tivity growth will become even more impor-
tant, in a relative sense, for the advancement
of living standards.
Productivity advance is also an essential
element of any strategy to ensure the sustain-
ability of natural resources and the environment.
While environmental sustainability is high on
the public agenda, there appears to be limited
public awareness of the positive role that pro-
ductivity can play. The paper by Nancy Olewiler
in this volume sheds new light on the contribu-
tion that productivity growth and technical
progress — the two go hand in hand — can
make to sustainability. Technological progress
can help improve the functioning of eco-systems
through the production of more energy-efficient
producer and consumer goods and the develop-
ment of products that do less damage to the
environment.
A socially aware understanding of pro-
ductivity must also incorporate the reciprocal
nature of the relationship. Productivity growth
is inﬂuenced by social factors that are the man-
ifestations of the social progress of a society.
Higher levels of educational attainment of the
workforce enhance productivity growth. Better
health makes workers more productive. Stronger
communications ﬂows across diverse groups in
modern multicultural societies promote learning
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The role of education is fundamental here.
Indeed, several chapters in the volume highlight
the essential role that education has played and
will continue to play in productivity and real
income growth. At the level of both the indi-
vidual and society, high levels of educational
attainment are associated with high productiv-
ity and high incomes, while low levels have the
opposite effect. Indeed, it is impossible to imag-
ine a productive 21st-century economy and soci-
ety that does not have a highly literate and
numerate workforce. Because of the externalities
associated with education and training, public
policy has an important role to play in fostering
human capital development. This perspective
also applies to health. It is a well-known fact
that improvements in population health have
also contributed signiﬁcantly to increased pro-
ductivity and living standards over time.
However, the productivity effects of health go
well beyond those associated with increased life
expectancy. We are only now beginning to
understand the multifaceted nature of the fac-
tors that inﬂuence the health of the labour force
and of the population as a whole.
In addition to highlighting the posi-
tive role of human capital, it is important to
clear away traditional mythologies that do
not stand up to close scrutiny. The belief that
there is an inevitable tradeoff between effi-
ciency and equality has long been an inﬂu-
ential assumption underlying policy debates
in Canada and many other Western nations.
This hardy perennial has been seriously
undermined by new research. To be sure, the
more recent argument that greater equality
and social spending actually contribute to
productivity growth also seems to lack con-
vincing support, at least in the case of
advanced economies. But in the real world of
public policy, debunking the assumption of
an implicit tradeoff represents a signiﬁcant
corrective to the intuitions and hunches that
shape choices. The need to assess social pro-
grams on a case-by-case basis, without the
aid of such default positions, may raise the
complexities confronting policy-makers. But
clearing away unsupported intuitions is a
healthy contribution to the policy process.
It is time to end the political posturing
between the advocates of productivity growth
and the defenders of social well-being. Doing
so requires accommodations on both sides.
Advocates of the productivity agenda need to
broaden their focus by highlighting the ways
in which productivity can enhance social
Canada and recognizing the contribution of
social well-being to future productivity. But
defenders of social Canada need to incorporate
productivity into the causes they hold dear.
Productivity growth does not automatically
fulﬁl collective aspirations, but it increases the
choices available to society and reduces the
zero-sum nature of alternatives facing gov-
ernment decision-makers.
The Long-Term and Indirect Role
of Public Policy
The primary drivers of labour productiv-
ity growth are to be found in the accumulation
of physical and human capital and technologi-
cal progress, and both of these drivers have their
own dynamic that is affected by public policy
only in the long term. Appropriate government
framework policies such as the rule of law are a
prerequisite for economic and productivity
growth. Long-term investments in human cap-
ital, as represented by education and health
care, are important. In the short term, speciﬁc
economic policies such as corporate tax rates
and R&D subsidies can affect productivity
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have detrimental effects.
But government seems to have much
less power on the upside to increase long-run
productivity growth beyond the trend pro-
ductivity determined by the underlying tech-
nological progress. For example, a recent study
by David Card and Richard Freeman (2002) of
the impact of the Thatcher reforms on British
productivity growth illustrates this point. They
found that the overall impact on aggregate
labour productivity growth of these sweeping
economic reforms (including laws that weak-
ened the coverage and power of trade unions,
privatized nationalized industries, and created
incentives for self-employment and share own-
ership) was 0.35 percentage points per year.
While the cumulative effects of 0.35 percent-
age points per year should not be dismissed,
the economic legacy of the Thatcher era is a
lesson in humility for ambitious political
reformers.
Another example of the overselling of
the positive productivity effects of public pol-
icy is the structural reforms instituted by the
Canadian government in the second half of
the 1980s and the early 1990s. A key ration-
ale for the implementation of the Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement, the introduction of
the GST, the privatization of Crown corpora-
tions, deregulation, tax reform and other
structural measures was that these policies
would foster productivity growth. While cer-
tain of these policies may have had some pos-
itive impact, the overall effect seems not
particularly large. Productivity growth in the
Canadian economy did not pick up after these
reforms were implemented.
Trend output per-hour growth in Canada
is projected to be around 2 percent per year over
the next decade based on technological advances.
It is doubtful that government policies aimed at
increasing productivity growth could improve
productivity growth dramatically above this
trend line. Trend productivity growth is still
largely determined by technological change,
which takes place outside Canada, and by the
investment behaviour of Canadian business.
Finally, determining which public poli-
cies and programs should be deﬁned as pro-
ductivity-related can be difficult. Indeed,
many government policies and programs that
are not motivated by productivity concerns
can have positive (and negative) effects on pro-
ductivity. A good example is the NASA pro-
gram in the United States, which was initially
set up to put a man on the moon by 1970, an
initiative motivated by the Cold War and the
desire of the Americans to beat the Russians
in the space race. This program led to massive
R&D, and much of this public research effort
produced important technological spinoffs
that improved productivity in the private sec-
tor, an unintended consequence. Another
example is the construction of divided high-
ways motivated by public concerns over road
safety. The construction of these new high-
ways in turn fosters productivity growth by
reducing transportation costs and stimulating
economic development in general.
All of this suggests that the role of pub-
lic policy is long-term and indirect, more akin
to the patient investor than the day trader.
Broadening the Productivity 
Debate: From Standard of 
Living to Quality of Life
The attitudes of Canadians towards pro-
ductivity appear to be surprisingly positive,
an elemental reality that should not be
ignored. According to survey results reported
by Frank Graves and Richard Jenkins,
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ductivity but prefer to link productivity to
quality-of-life issues than to narrower eco-
nomic concerns. Thus support for productiv-
ity as a societal priority is conditioned by an
insistence that the larger goal is a better qual-
ity of life rather than simply a raised econom-
ic standard of living, and that a policy agenda
focused on increasing the productivity of the
Canadian economy should not come at the
expense of other priorities. Governments
would be well advised to take this observation
into account in developing policies that relate
to productivity growth and in promoting any
productivity or innovation agenda.
Despite the importance of productivity
growth for improvements in economic well-
being, productivity is not a panacea for soci-
ety’s problems, and should not be oversold.
Productivity gains and the resulting higher
incomes alone will not solve social problems
such as poverty, pollution and crime. But
they do widen the choices open to Canadians,
by increasing the public and private resources
that can be allocated to address these issues.
CONCLUSION
In the end, our plea is for a social under-
standing of productivity. Productivity does not
simply enhance our material standard of living;
it also expands the range of choices available to
Canadians. Enhanced productivity will not
automatically increase the social well-being of
Canadians, but it will reduce the apparently
zero-sum nature of many of the decisions that
we face today, and make it easier to achieve the
economic and social goals that have deﬁned
Canada as a distinctive society on the northern
half of the North American continent.
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